Becoming less agency dependent, and as a result reducing the burden of high commissions, is something most UAE developers can only dream of. Two structural issues prevent a significant shift to reduce agency dependency and commission costs.
The first issue is the aligned-incentive structure that dominates the current off-plan market.
Developers want to sell their projects. Agencies want to sell units. The incentives are aligned, and the market functions. But this alignment comes with two significant downsides.
The first downside is agency dependency. Developers become dependent on agencies not only to sell their projects, but also for their information position. Buyer behaviour and buyer data are registered at agent level and only partially reaches the developer. The second downside is the commission burden. For a developer operating at scale, this burden can easily run into hundreds of millions annually, if not more.
The moment a developer attempts to reduce that dependency and its associated costs, friction arises with the agent network. When 80 to 90% of all sales flow through that network, friction in that channel is the last thing any developer wants.
The second issue is on the buyer side of the equation.
The current off-plan market is agency dominated on both sides. For developers on one side, but for buyers on the other side it is no different. The average buyer who wants to research off-plan properties, understand all available options, and make a decision that genuinely serves their interests, faces roadblock after roadblock. At every turn they are asked to leave personal data behind, which pulls them into a cycle of agent outreach.
From that moment, agents guide that potential buyer toward project A over project B, not seldom based on commission incentives rather than the buyer's best interest. In this model, developers effectively compete on who pays the highest commission. Those who prefer not to participate in that unhealthy competition find commission-driven guidance actively working against them. For the average buyer, becoming a truly informed buyer is close to impossible. Yet the most informed buyer has the highest probability of ending up with a unit from a developer whose product genuinely matches the buyer's needs. Instead, in the current market, buyers not seldom end up with a product that reflects the interests of the middleman rather than their own.
This process not only damages trust among buyers, it also creates an inefficient market. Fewer roadblocks and less intervention bring the buyer closer to the product. The closer a buyer can get to the product, the more efficient the market as a whole becomes. Markets always tend toward efficiency. When a dominant market force profits from inefficiency and actively hinders the natural flow between buyer and producer (developer), an inefficient market is the result. Disruption then becomes a when-question, not an if-question. Disruption as inevitability.
The way the current market is structured, and the way incentives within it guide both buyers and developers, makes reducing agency dependency close to impossible. Both buyers and developers are agency dependent. One could argue that both are forced into a weak position by a strong and dominant middleman who has every incentive to keep them there. Only an outsider-disruptor can break the chains of dependency, and only if it is done for both buyers and developers simultaneously.